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RECENT DECISIONS
At common law, some authorities hold that service of process on
Sunday is valid,'1 2 saying it is merely a ministerial act; although the
day itself is non-judicial so that no valid judicial act, such as entering
a judgment, can be performed. However, most states have enacted
statutes in regard to Sunday service, as in the principal case.
C. I. .
SPECIFIC PERFORMANcE-CONTRACT FOR SALE OF REAL PROP-
ERTY-HARDSHIP AS A DEFENSE-ZONING REGULATIONs.-Action
by vendor to compel specific performance of a contract for the sale
of real property. At the time the contract was made, both parties
knew of the vendee's intention to erect a storage plant on the prem-
ises, which use of such property was not prohibited by any zoning
ordinance then in existence. Thereafter, but prior to the date set
for the closing, the area was rezoned, so that the lot could be used
only for residences, thus frustrating the purpose for which the vendee
desired to use the lot. Held, specific performance, being a discre-
tionary remedy, will not be decreed where it will produce hardship
through a change of circumstances not contemplated by the parties.
Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 45 S. E. 2d 875 (1948).
The court, while admitting the existence in Virginia, of the doc-
trine of equitable conversion, namely, that equity ". . . looks upon
things agreed to be done as actually performed,"' and that gen-
erally where there is a valid contract for the sale of real estate, equity
will treat the buyer as the owner of the property and the vendor as
the owner of the purchase price, denied that its application was a
matter of right.. The doctrine is a .mere fiction invented by courts of
equity to be applied only when necessity and justice require its exer-
cise. Where a change in circumstances, not contemplated by either
party, has rendered the contract harsh and oppressive, it will not be
enforced. 2 Equity will regard that which is agreed to be done as
actually performed, only "... . where nothing has intervened which
ought to prevent a performance." 3 Whether or not specific per-
formance will be decreed, lies within the sound discretion of the
court. Here in the light of the complete defeat of the purpose of
the contract, it was deemed inequitable to require the vendee to
specifically perform.
1250 Am. JuR., Sundays and Holidays §81 (1944); 60 C. J. 1138 (1932).
1 Dunsmore v. Lyle, 87 Va. 391, 392, 12 S. E. 610, 611 (1891).
2 Tazewell Coal & Iron Co. v. Gillespie, 113 Va. 134, 75 S. E. 757 (1912).
3 Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563, 4 L. ed. 460 (1818).
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In the case of Anderson v. Steinway,4 relied on by the Virginia
court, involving substantially the same fact situation as the Virginia
case, the New York court arrived at the same result, on the same
ground that specific performance would not be decreed where it would
result in hardship, due to a change in circumstances not contemplated
by the parties. The court relied strongly upon Willard v. Taloe 5 and
Gotthelf v. Stranahan. 6 While these two cases support such a hold-
ing, the weight of authority in New York is to the contrary, and
supports the view that where a contract has been fairly obtained,
without fraud, mistake or inequitable conduct, the right to have it
specifically performed is a positive right, which the court is bound
to enforce,7 and the fact that there is such a change of conditions
as will 'unfavorably effect a party to the contract, is no reason for
refusing to decree specific performance.8
If we examine the Anderson case in the light of the Biggs case,9
which arose out of the same transaction, and was decided only a few
years later, the fact that the Anderson case is an exception becomes
much clearer. In each case, the defendant-vendee contracted for the
purchase of a lot, the two lots involved adjoining one another, with
the intention of erecting one structure covering the two lots. It was
provided in each contract that if either vendor was unable to convey
marketable title, the vendee would not be required to take the lot.
A subsequent zoning regulation made it impossible for the vendee to
use the Anderson lot, as he desired, but did not affect the Biggs lot.
The court refused specific performance in the Anderson case on the
ground of hardship, but when the Biggs case came up for decision,
it granted specific performance. The court's basis for distinction was
that in the Anderson case, the vendor's land was affected, whereas in
the Biggs case, it was not. However, the Anderson case was decided
on the basis of hardship alone, and the contract was equally onerous
in the Biggs case, for the vendee needed both lots free of restrictions
to effectuate his intentions. If this were puiely a doctrine of hard-
ship, specific performance would have been refused in both cases.
Nor can the cases be reconciled in the only other manner possible,
that is, on the ground that the court treats a zoning restriction as an
4 Anderson v. Steinway & Sons, 178 App. Div. 507, 165 N. Y. Supp. 608
(1st Dep't 1917), aff'd, 221 N. Y. 639, 117 N. E. 575 (1917).5 Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 501 (1869) (court refused
specific performance of option contract where value of new currency which
was made legal tender was much less than gold and silver which was in use
when contract was made).
6 Gotthelf v. Stranahan, 138 N. Y. 345, 34 N. E. 286 (1893) (court re-
fused specific performance of contract to convey free of incumbrances where
heavy assessment laid on the property after contract).
7 Losee v. Morey and Cramer, 57 Barb. 561 (N. Y. 1865).
8 Prospect Park and Coney Island R. R. v. Brooklyn R. R., 144 N. Y.
152, 39 N. E. 17 (1894).
9 Biggs v. Steinway & Sons, 229 N. Y. 320, 128 N. E. 211 (1920).
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incumbrance, for the court specifically states that it is not an incum-
brance. Furthermore if it were an incumbrance, the vendee would
not have been liable under the contract, as it released him if the title
to either lot were unmarketable. Therefore, the case of subsequent
zoning regulation must be treated as an exception to the general rule
in New York, that where a bargain is fair when made, the fact that
changing circumstances have made it a hard one, is no defense to
specific performance.' 0
M. S. R.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL AGREEMENT FOR PARTITION OF
LAND-INVALIDITY OF DEFENSE OF ORAL AGREEMENT NOT TO PAR-
TITION IN ACTION BROUGHT FOR PARTITION.-An action was brought
in the Court of Chancery in New Jersey for the partition of land.
The defendants interposed an answer alleging that they and the com-
plainants agreed orally with each other not to bring any suit for the
partition of land before August 23, 1948, the maturity date of a cer-
tain mortgage. The complainants moved to strike out the answer
upon the ground that the alleged agreement was unenforcible under
those sections of the New Jersey Statute of Frauds known as R. S.
25:1-2 and 5(d) N. J. S. A. The first of these sections provides
that no interest in real estate shall be surrendered unless by deed or
note in writing. The second that no action shall be brought upon an
"oral contract or sale of real estate, or any interest in or concerning
the same." Held, that the agreement set forth in the answer was
within the statute and unenforcible, constituted no defense to the ac-
tion and had to be stricken out. Wujciak v. Wujciak, et al., - N. J.
Eq. -, 55 A. 2d 164 (1947).
The precise question involved apparently had never previously
been presented to the New Jersey courts for consideration; but the
second section of the statute which forbids the bringing of an action
has been construed to preclude the use of such an oral contract as a
defense.'
The court found support for its conclusion in other comparable
situations. Thus it was held that the oral consent of one who enjoys
an easement of light and air that the owner of the servient tenement
might build in disregard of the easement was unenforcible; 2 likewise
the oral permission given an abutting owner to erect a building en-
-0 Sanford v. Smith, - Misc. -, 66 N. Y. S. -d 780 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Urbis
Realty Co. v. Globe Realty Co., 235 N. Y. 194, 139 N. E. 238 (1923) ; Froehlich
v. K. W. W. Holding Co., 116 Misc. 275, 190 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
I Brands v. Cassidy, 125 N. J. Eq. 346, 5 A. 2d 685 (Ch. 1939); id., 124
N. J. Eq. 417, 1 A. 2d 639 (Ch. 1938).2 Ware v. Chew, 43 N. J. Eq. 493, 11 Atl. 746 (Ch. 1888).
